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THE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE'S LACK OF
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND INSPECTION FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HACCP REGULATIONS
Dennis R. Johnson &Jolyda 0. Swaim*
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 25, 1996, the United States Department of Agriculture's
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)' published a massive set of
regulations designed to take meat and poultry inspection into the
next century. Commonly referred to as the "Mega-Reg," these rules
were intended to move inspection away from the organoleptic
examination of animals, products, and facilities that had been the
procedure since the 1906 Meat Inspection Act2 to an inspection
system focused on the current public health risk-microbial
* Dennis R. Johnson is a principal at Olsson, Frank and Weeda, P.C. in
Washington, D.C., where he specializes in FDA enforcement issues. He was a Food
and Drug Law Institute Fellow at George Washington University's National Law
Center in 1982, where he earned his LL.M. degree. Since that time Mr. Johnson
has been very active in lobbying the FDA and has published other articles on
HACCP and other FDA enforcement issues.
Jolyda 0. Swaim is an associate at Olsson, Frank and Weeda, P.C. in
Washington, D.C., where she specializes in food safety law and regulation
representing large and small meat and poultry companies before the United States
Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service. She became an
attorney after spending years in the food industry-her last position as Corporate
Food Safety Director for Sara Lee Foods. She has "hands on" experience in the
areas of HACCP, sanitation, quality assurance, and production as it relates to the
food industry. Ms. Swaim graduated Cum Laude from Thomas M. Cooley Law
School in 2004.
1. FSIS is the agency within the Department of Agriculture authorized to
implement and to enforce the inspection acts. Even though the statutes themselves
refer to the Secretary of Agriculture, for ease, this article will only refer to FSIS. 9
C.F.R. § 300.2; see also FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICES (FSIS), About FSIS, at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About FSIS/index.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2005).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
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contamination-Listeria monocytogenes,3 Salmonella,4  and E. coli
0157:H7.'
In conjunction with the change in inspection regulations, a
change has been made in enforcement. If an inspected
establishment did not modify its procedures to comply with the new
rules, or was unable or unwilling to comply with the new regulatory
requirements, FSIS would take administrative action to "suspend"
inspectors at the establishment and if the establishment still could
not comply, FSIS would move, in an administrative proceeding, to
withdraw inspection. Since the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)
and the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA)6 require inspection
for the processing of meat and poultry products, suspension or
withdrawal of inspection has the practical effect of closing a plant.
Since the implementation of the Mega-Reg, the agency has had
mixed success with its new enforcement procedures. Although most
establishments have chosen to work with FSIS to modify their
procedures to allay any concerns the agency had, on a few occasions,
no compromise was reached. In these cases, the establishment filed
suit in federal district court challenging the agency's authority to
remove inspectors for failure to comply with the Mega-Reg. In the
three cases where the agency's authority was challenged, the
establishment was successful and inspection was restored.7
The agency's lack of success has raised a question of whether
FSIS indeed has the enforcement authority it claims or whether the
agency merely failed to articulate the basis sufficiently in these cases.
Based on a review of the enabling statutes and past cases, it would
appear FSIS does have authority to suspend inspection but only in
certain well-defined circumstances. The inspection acts simply are
not sufficient to provide an enforcement basis for any and all non-
compliances with the Mega-Reg. Indeed, FSIS can suspend
inspection only if there are insanitary conditions at the facility, and
3. CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION (CFSAN), Foodborne
Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natural Toxins Handbook, available at http://vm.cfsan
.fda .gov/ -mow/chap6.html.
4. DIVISION OF BACTERIAL & MYCOTIC DISEASE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION (CDC), Disease Information: Salmonellosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellosis_g,htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
5. DIVISION OF BACTERIAL AND MYCOTIC DISEASES, CDC, Disease Information:
Escherichia coli 0157:H7, at http:/Aww.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/
escherichiacoli g.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2005),
6. 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1999).
7. See infra Section V.
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those conditions have caused or could reasonably cause adulteration
of any product. Without such showing, the government simply
cannot suspend inspection.
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Statutory Language
In cases of statutory authority, it is best to begin with the plain
language of the authorizing legislation.' The only section which
speaks of suspension that could be relevant to this inquiry is Section
8 of FMIA.9 This section provides, in relevant part, "where the
sanitary conditions of any such establishment are such that the meat
or meat food products are rendered adulterated, [FSIS] shall refuse
to allow said meat or meat food products to be labeled, marked,
stamped, or tagged as 'inspected and passed."'10 Under the plain
language of this provision, FSIS must have a basis to conclude that
the insanitary conditions result in the products being "rendered
adulterated" to impose suspension."
FMIA also contains a section specifying what constitutes
adulteration. In the context of the Mega-Reg, FSIS has relied on the
adulteration provision dealing with insanitary conditions, which
provides that a food may be adulterated "[i]f it has been prepared,
8. See generally Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (1999). The inspection acts also permit FSIS to refuse or
withdraw inspection if:
* The establishment refused to destroy a condemned carcass, 21 U.S.C.
§ 604 (2004) (meat);
* The establishment refused to destroy condemned meat or meat food
product, 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2004) (meat);
o The establishment (or a responsibly connected individual) had been
convicted of certain crimes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 467 (1999) (poultry), 671
(2004) (meat); and
" A livestock slaughter facility is operating in violation of the Humane
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1999).
10. Section 8 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 608 (1999).
11. The actual language of FMIA does not technically provide for suspension of
inspection or the removal of federal inspectors. It only authorizes the refusal to
mark products "inspected and passed." The inspector must remain in the facility.
It is PPIA which speaks of "refusing inspection." 21 U.S.C. § 456(b) (2004).
However, for the purposes of this article, we will treat the refusal to mark products
the same as a suspension where the inspector actually leaves the facility.
2005]
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packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth or whereby it may have been
rendered injurious to health."12  It would seem that the plain
language authorizes FSIS to refuse to mark products or, in effect,
suspend inspection if the cleanliness of the facility is so far below
standards that the product may be implicated. There was no
indication that a failure to comply with a Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Point (HACCP)13 regulation would be contemplated by the
language, nor was it contemplated by the legislative history.
B. Legislative History
The first mandatory federal meat inspection act is almost 100
years old. Since the first enactment, one major, permanent change
occurred in 1967. Amendments in 1986 would have resulted in
substantial changes had the provisions not expired in 1992. For
poultry, the inspection act developed separately, becoming a manda-
tory inspection program in 1957,14 with its one major revision
occurring in 1968, which made PPIA more consistent with the
changes to FMIA the previous year.
15
1. 1906 Meat Inspection Act
The first mandatory federal meat inspection program had its
genesis in fiction, specifically, The Jungle by Upton Sinclair. 6 The
book was written as an expos6 of working conditions in the cities;
only twelve pages of the book actually described the filth and animal
disease at slaughterhouses. However, the description of the
insanitary conditions and practices were enough to cause a public
outcry for change. The net result was the creation of a mandatory
federal meat inspection program as part of the Agricultural
Appropriations Act of 1906.1" The purpose of the program was the
"restoration of public confidence, not only in our own country but in
12. Section 8 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4). The identical language appears in
Section 4 (g)(4 ) PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 4 53(g)(4 ) (1999).
13. 9 C.F.R. § 417.1 (2004).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
15. Id.; Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
16. UPTON SINCLAIR, THEJUNGLE (Penguin Books 1985).
17. Agricultural Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 382, 34 Stat. 669 (1906) ch. 3913;
REP. 4935, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906).
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other countries, in the purity and wholesomeness of American meat
and meat products."'"
The essence of the 1906 program has been virtually unchanged.
All slaughtering and processing of meat for interstate or foreign
commerce must be conducted under inspection by federal govern-
ment officials. Indeed, no product may enter commerce unless it
has been so inspected. Products found to be wholesome will be
labeled "inspected and passed," while products found unwholesome
shall be condemned and destroyed under the supervision of the
inspector. 9
The main focus of the 1906 Act was (and remains) the product
itself and the condition of the facility. In order for a product to
enter commerce, it cannot be "unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome,
or otherwise unfit. '20 As to facilities, there was no provision in the
1906 Act for the government to refuse to provide inspection at any
establishment. In order that sanitation be addressed, the Act simply
prohibited products to be marked "inspected and passed" if pro-
duced under insanitary conditions. According to the accompanying
congressional report, this provision "provides for a strict sanitary
inspection of all establishments, under the provisions of this law and
under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of
Agriculture."'" Interestingly, the original act did not contain any




In 1907, Congress codified the 1906 appropriations language
into the Meat Inspection Act. For the next sixty years, there were
no changes in terms of how meat was inspected under the law. Yet,
there were two developments in other acts which would have
implications for meat inspection.
The first development involved the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).2 4 A predecessor statute, the Pure Food and
18. REP. 4935, 59th Cong. 1st Sess. (1906) at 7.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 607 (1999).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 602 (2004).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Meat Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 59-242, § 34 Stat. 1262 (1907).
24. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2004).
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Drugs Act, was adopted in 1906 along with the Meat Inspection Act.
However, the earlier statute did not address insanitary conditions
with regard to food production or distribution. To remedy that
deficiency, a definition of "adulteration" was introduced. A product
may be adulterated, and hence illegal, "if it has been prepared,
packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been
rendered injurious to health." 5 According to the legislative history
of this provision, the purpose of such a definition was to "require the
observance of a reasonably decent standard of cleanliness in handling
food products."26 This provision would generate numerous cases on
what constitutes "insanitary conditions." These cases would become
relevant to meat and poultry inspection when, in 1967 and 1968,
Congress adopted the identical definitions for the inspection acts.
The second development was the adoption of a mandatory
inspection program for poultry in 1957.28 Until that time, poultry
was primarily a local operation with consumers selecting live birds
which would be custom-slaughtered at the retail location. Any
company desiring federal inspection could request such service, but
it was a voluntary program run by a different division of the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA).29  However, as poultry
operations became less local, Congress enacted PPIA in 1957.3o
Although modeled after the Meat Inspection Act, the provisions
have never been completely consistent. For example, while manda-
tory post-mortem inspection of carcasses is required by both the
meat and poultry inspection acts, inspection of further poultry
processing is not mandated by the statute."' In the context of the
agency's authority with regard to sanitary conditions, PPIA provided
authority to "refuse to render inspection at any establishment whose
premises, facilities, or equipment, or the operation thereof, fail to"
25. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4) (1999).
26. S. 2800, 73rd Cong. (1934) (emphasis added).
27. In adopting this language for the Meat Inspect Act, Congress intended that
"essentially the same criteria be applied in determining wholesomeness .... S.
REP. No. 90-799, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2188, 2203.
28. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957).
29. The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, 7 U.S.C. § 1622(h) (2004).
30. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. No. 85-172, 71 Stat. 441 (1957).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2004).
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comply with the sanitary practices required by regulations of the
Secretary. 2
3. 1967-1968
In 1967, Congress amended the Meat Inspection Act. The
previous act only addressed products moving in interstate or foreign
commerce. Meat produced and sold solely within a state was not
covered by the mandatory federal program. To ensure national
uniformity, Congress enacted the Wholesome Meat Act 33 mandating
that meat in intrastate commerce must be produced under a state
inspection program at least equal to the federal program or the
facility must be inspected by the federal government. The Whole-
some Meat Act, when combined with the Meat Inspection Act,
became FMIA.34
In addition to addressing intrastate issues, Congress made other
revisions. First, it expressly specified certain instances when FSIS
could suspend or withdraw inspection.35  Second, it added a
definitional section which included definitions of adulteration,
including the provision related to insanitary conditions. Interesting-
ly, Congress did not amend the provision dealing with refusal to
mark products when produced under insanitary conditions; it
maintained the existing version which was inconsistent with the
poultry act.
In 1968, Congress adopted the Wholesome Poultry Act,36 which
made the same changes regarding the authority to suspend or
withdraw inspection and the definition of adulteration. Congress
32. Section 6 of the 1957 Act (currently codified at 21 U.S.C. § 456).
33. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
34. Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967).
35. 21 U.S.C. § 608 (1999). The inspection acts also permit FSIS to refuse or
withdraw inspection if:
" The establishment refused to destroy a condemned carcass, 21 U.S.C.
§ 604 (2004) (meat);
" The establishment refused to destroy condemned meat or meat food
product, 21 U.S.C. § 606 (2004) (meat);
" The establishment (or a responsibly connected individual) had been
convicted of certain crimes, 21 U.S.C. §§ 467 (1999) (poultry), 671
(2004) (meat); and
" A livestock slaughter facility is operating in violation of the Humane
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1906 (1999).
36. Wholesome Poultry Products Act, Pub. L. No. 90-492, 82 Stat. 791 (1968).
2005]
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again left untouched the provision dealing with refusal to provide
inspection for insanitary conditions.
4. 1986 Processed Products Inspection Improvement Act
In 1986, Congress amended FMIA to provide the government
with more discretion in allocating resources for inspection of
processed products.3 7 FMIA permitted FSIS to move away from less
than daily inspection of processing operations.3' Given the con-
troversy surrounding this change, the act would expire in six years
absent Congressional re-authorization, which it did on November
11, 1992.
As part of the package to permit less continuous inspection, a
new enforcement authority was added to Section 401 of FMIA.
Under this section, FSIS could suspend and/or withdraw inspection
for the repeated failure of an establishment to comply with agency
regulations if such non-compliance posed a direct and substantial
threat to public health. 9  However, in order to exercise this
authority, FSIS had to follow very precise procedural requirements.
In the conference report accompanying the legislation, Congress
made clear that the power to suspend inspection was an
"extraordinary power" and could only be exercised in extreme cases
and then only with full due process protections. 40  For reasons
unknown, though likely due to the procedural requirements, FSIS
never once sought to exercise this authority.
C. Recap of the Statutory Precedents
Several observations can be made regarding the statutory
provisions and legislative history summarized above. First, the plain
language does not easily support an expansion of the authority
regarding insanitary conditions as it relates to processing issues, such
as HACCP. The initial inspection act was designed to address the
sanitary condition of the facilities as reported in The Jungle, which
focused on the cleanliness of the facility (or lack thereof). Second,
the limited discussion of what constitutes "insanitary conditions"
37. Future Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, 100 Stat. 3556 (1986).
38. PPIA already permitted such discretion, and hence was not part of the 1986
Amendments. 21 U.S.C. § 455(b).
39. Future Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641, 100 Stat. 3556 (1986).
40. H. CONF. REP. 99-995 at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6066, 6083.
[VOL. 1:337
FSIS & FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH HACCP
would seem to imply that Congress intended the term be interpreted
according to its common meaning of "cleanliness." Third, and most
importantly, Congress was careful to restrict the authority to suspend
operations to those precise situations specified in the statutes.
4'
No matter how a court wishes to interpret the statutory
authority, it is undeniable that for FSIS to suspend inspections,
insanitary conditions must be demonstrated at the facility. This, in
turn, raises the issue of what constitutes "insanitary conditions."
III. INSANITARY CONDITIONS
In adopting the provisions dealing with sanitation, Congress did
not define what constitutes "insanitary conditions." However, in
practice, the government focused on the physical conditions of the
facility, at least initially. For example, in an old FSIS Directive just
recently revoked, FSIS defined sanitation by the performance
standard of: "look clean, feel clean and smell clean."
4
1
Not surprisingly, in all but one of the cases brought under the
insanitary conditions provision where the government was successful,
there was evidence of "visual" insanitary conditions at the facility.
43
41. See supra Sections II.A. & B.
42. FSIS Directive 11,000.1, § 4.2.1.2 (Jan. 25, 2000) (emphasis in original).
43. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (noting visual evidence of
rodent activity); United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86 (1964)
(reflecting food in warehouse visually accessible to rodents, birds and insects);
United States v. King's Trading, Inc., 724 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1983) (showing visual
evidence of rodent activity); United States v. H.B. Gregory, 502 F.2d 700, 704-05
(7th Cir. 1974) (showing visual evidence of rodent activity); United States v. Cassaro,
Inc., 443 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1971) (demonstrating visual evidence of insect
infestation); United States v. Hammond Milling Co., 413 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1969)
(finding visual evidence of rodent activity); International Exterminator, 294 F.2d
270 (5th Cir. 1961) (placing poisonous liquid in close proximity to foods); Berger v.
United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1952) (reflecting visual evidence of
rodent and bird activity, and insect infestation); Triangle Candy Co. v. United
States, 144 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1944) (noting visual evidence of rodent activity and
insect infestation); United States v. Gel Spices Co., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 1205
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (showing visual evidence of rodent activity and insect infestation);
G. A. Portello & Co. v. Butz, 345 F. Supp. 1204 (D.C. 1972) (reflecting visual
evidence of physical contamination of meat containers); United States v. 1200 Cans,
339 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (finding various visual insanitary conditions,
including failure to wash and sanitize eggs prior to breaking); United States v. 44
Cases, Etc., 101 F. Supp 658 (E.D. Ill. 1951) (showing visual evidence of insect
infestation and physical contamination); United States v. Roma Macaroni Factory,
75 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Cal. 1947) (noting visual evidence of rodent activity); United
20051
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The seminal case where the government failed to establish physical
contamination and, therefore, lost was United States v. General Foods
Corp.44  In that case, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
sought to establish insanitary conditions through the use of labora-
tory analysis of mold.4' The court rejected the FDA position noting
that the laboratory analysis of the mold on equipment was not
determinative, in part, because there was no visual evidence of build
up or "slime" on the equipment.46 Moreover, the court noted that
the mold could not be eliminated through normal good
manufacturing practices.47
Based upon the loss in General Foods, FDA adopted a policy that
it would not initiate any insanitary conditions cases based solely on
bacteriological analysis.4' Although FDA reserved the right to bring
actions based upon pathogens, in the years that followed, FDA
always included some evidence of visual contamination even when
the case was primarily brought due to pathogenic contamination.49
In only one case has the government been successful in the
absence of any visual contamination-United States v. Nova Scotia
Foods Products Corp.50 However, that case did not involve a regulatory
action against a product, rather it was brought by FDA to compel a
smoked fish processor comply with the FDA's regulation regarding
time-temperature-salinity (T-T-S) requirements for processing of
smoked fish."
States v. Lazere, 56 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Iowa 1944) (demonstrating visual evidence
of rodent activity and insect infestation).
44. 446 F. Supp. 740, 744 (N.D.N.Y.), affd 591 F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 752.
47. Id. at 754.
48. RICHARD A. MERRILL AND PETER BARTON HUTrr, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 27 (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1980).
49. Continental Seafood, Inc. v. Schweiker, 674 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (showing
visual evidence of insanitary conditions supporting finding of Salmonella in shrimp);
United States v. Blue Ribbon Smoked Fish, Inc. et al., 179 F. Supp. 30 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (reflecting visual evidence of insanitary conditions supporting a finding of
Listeria monocytogenes in fish); United States v. Union Cheese, 902 F. Supp 778, 786
(N.D. Ohio 1995) (demonstrating visual evidence of insanitary conditions
supporting a finding of Listeria monocytogenes in cheese); United States v. 1200 Cans,
339 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (finding visual evidence of insanitary conditions
supporting finding of Salmonella in eggs).
50. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 242-43.
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Unlike the inspection acts, which grant FSIS the authority to
establish not only sanitary requirements but processing requirements
as well, FDCA does not grant FDA such authority.52 Hence, to justify
these types of regulations, FDA had to rely on the adulteration pro-
visions. In the case of the T-T-S regulation, FDA used the adultera-
tion provision dealing with insanitary conditions." In Nova Scotia,
the district court granted the FDA's request for an injunction,54 and
the processor appealed.5
For the purposes of the appeal, it was agreed by both parties
that there were no physical "insanitary conditions" in the plant. 6
Hence, the straightforward legal issue was whether FDA could
establish precise processing requirements under the statutory
provision dealing with insanitary conditions. The Second Circuit
held that FDA did have this authority.57 Although the court ruled in
the FDA's favor, the opinion evidences the court's recognition that it
was stretching the language to support its conclusion that FDA needs
such authority. For example, the court admitted "that on a first
reading the language of the subsection appears to cover only
'insanitary conditions,' 'whereby it [the food] may have been
rendered injurious to health' . . . and a plausible argument can be
made that the references are to insanitary conditions in the plant
itself . . .""
To justify its expansion beyond the plain language, the court
relied on a series of FDA cases which held that FDCA should be read
broadly to protect the public health.59 The court also relied on the
absence of any Congressional intent to limit FDA's authority, stating
that "in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress'
intention, [the court is] unwilling to prohibit administrative action
52. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2004).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4).
54. 417 F. Supp. 1364 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
55. Id.
56. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 243.
57. Id. at 247.
58. Id. at 245 (emphasis in original). It should be noted that this decision was
rendered before Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. It is questionable whether under the
Chevron analysis the court could have ignored the plain language of the statute.
59. Id. at 246 (and cases cited therein).
2005]
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imperative for the achievement of an agency's ultimate purposes.""
Indeed, it found no evidence of Congressional intent on this issue.6 '
Beyond its statutory construction, the court marshaled other
practical arguments to support its novel interpretation.2 First, it
commented that "no lawyer at the knowledgeable Food and Drug
bar ever raised the question . . . or even hinted at" the lack of
statutory authority. Second, the court noted that Department of
Agriculture had such authority under the authority to establish
sanitary conditions.65 Under FMIA, similar standards have been
established under Section 608 (sanitary conditions).' Third, a
contrary holding would have implications far beyond the present
case, since it would invalidate other similar FDA regulations.
In short, the court in Nova Scotia wrote a result-oriented opinion
to justify its decision that FDA should have the authority to establish
processing requirements for public safety and enjoin processors who
refused to follow such regulations. As an interesting endnote,
however, the court did invalidate the T-T-S rule on procedural
grounds.65
IV. THE MEGA-REG
For over thirty years, there had been calls to take inspection into
the modern age. When first enacted in 1906, the focus was placed
upon animal diseases and insanitary conditions. The changes to
FMIA in 196766 and the adoption of PPIA67 still retained the focus
on organoleptic examinations.
60. Id. (quoting In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968)).
61. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d 240, 248. Consistent with the notion that the court
recognized it was proceeding beyond the plain language, it commented that "We
believe.., that it would be in the public interest for Congress to consider" expressly
addressing the issue of processing standards.
62. Id.
63. It is this reference that FSIS has relied upon to interpret Section 8 of
FMIA-a statement that was, at most dicta. Id.
64. Id.
65. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 248.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 451 (1999).
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A. HACCP in General
In 1983, FSIS asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)6"
to evaluate the inspection system and recommend changes to
enhance public health protection. In 1985, NAS issued a report,
"Meat and Poultry Inspection: The Scientific Basis of the Nation's
Program."69 The report identified microbial contamination as the
number one public health issue7-an issue with which the 1906
inspection system could not cope. To address pathogens, NAS
recommended that FSIS require all establishments to adopt and to
implement HACCP systems.7 This recommendation was reiterated
in two subsequent NAS studies: "Poultry Inspection: The Basis for a
Risk Assessment Approach"72 and "Cattle Inspection: Committee on
Evaluation of USDA Streamlined Inspection System for Cattle (SIS-
C)."
73
NAS was not alone in calling for change; the Government
Accounting Office (GAO) issued several reports, culminating in a
1994 report entitled "Food Safety: Risk-Based Inspections and
Microbial Monitoring Needed for Meat and Poultry, '74 which
recommended the adoption of HACCP systems at meat and poultry
establishments. Industry also called for adoption of HACCP systems
as did the government's premier advisory body, the National
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods
(NACMCF).75 Indeed, NACMCF was the primary organization in
refining and disseminating HACCP.
68. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, About NAS, at http://www.nasonline.org/
site/PageServer?pagename-=ABOUTmainpage (last visited Sept. 18, 2005).
69. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Meat and Poultry Inspection: The Scientific
Basis of the Nation's Program (1985).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Poultry Inspection: The Basis for a Risk
Assessment Approach (1987).
73. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Cattle Inspection: Committee on Evaluation
of USDA Streamlined Inspection System for Cattle (1990).
74. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Food Safety: Risk Based Inspections and
Microbial Monitoring Needed for Meat and Poultry (1994).
75. Id.
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Initially developed to provide safe food for the space program
by Pillsbury,76 HACCP is a food safety approach which seeks to
prevent problems in processing rather than reacting to problems in
the finished product.77 An establishment identifies potential sources
of food safety hazards with regard to each of its processes and
products.78 It then assesses whether those hazards pose a true risk in
its operations-in other words, whether a hazard is reasonably likely
to occur in absence of control.79 The establishment also identifies
the steps that can prevent, eliminate, or reduce the hazard to
acceptable levels.80 Having identified the risk and the step to
eliminate the risk, the establishment completes the analysis by
identifying those critical controls which can be employed in the
process and then monitors those controls." For example, raw meat
may contain pathogens. It is reasonably likely that these pathogens
would remain in ready-to-eat (RTE) products unless eliminated by a
step in the process. Hence, in converting raw meat to RTE, the
establishment must include a step to eliminate this hazard. This
hazard elimination by cooking the meat at a particular time and
temperature is sufficient to destroy the pathogens. To ensure safety,
the establishment must only monitor the time and temperature of
cooking to ensure the product has received a sufficient lethality. All
of the analysis and the monitoring is documented so that with a
review of the records, the processor can ensure the safety of the food
so there would be no need to test every product for a pathogen.
B. FSIS's Initial Reluctance to Adopt HACCP Regulations
Notwithstanding the near universal support for HACCP by
scientists and industry, FSIS did not move rapidly towards adoption.
This reluctance was likely due to the fundamental change in
76. See Delilah Dill Schuller, Comment, Pathogen Reduction Through "HACCP"
Systems: Is Overhaul of the Meat Inspection System All It's Cut Out To Be?, 8 S.J. AGRIc. L.
REV. 77, 85 (1998).
77. See FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION, HACCP: A State of the Art Approach to Food
Safety (Oct. 2001).
78. See FEDERAL DRUG ADMINISTRATION & UNITED STATES DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE,
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMirEE ON MICROBIOLOGICAL CRITERIA FOR FOODS, HACCP
&Application Guidelines, Aug. 14, 1997, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-comnx/
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approach, which would be required to transition from an active
organoleptic inspection system to a HACCP system where FSIS
inspectors basically review records and monitor activities.
The unique feature of the inspection acts is that they mandate
the continuous presence of a government inspector in the plant.8 2
This inspector, in theory, must make an affirmative decision
regarding each and every product as to whether or not it is
adulterated. If he or she has any questions or concerns, such
concerns must be addressed or the product will be retained or the
equipment and facilities rejected for use."3 As a result of this
authority, FSIS adopted approval requirements for all aspects of a
plant's operations including that the facility and equipment must be
approved prior to use, that the maximum line speeds for slaughter
operations must follow regulations, and that the product processing
and labeling must be approved prior to use.8 4 This system was
known as "command and control," which is an appropriate name
because virtually all aspects of a plant's operations were dictated by
FSIS."5
HACCP does not work that way. It is a plant's responsibility to
design its system based upon its unique facility and processes to
monitor its operations and document compliance with its program,
and to ensure no unsafe product enters commerce. 6 Placing the
responsibility on the plant leaves the FSIS inspector with little to do.
NACMCF published a report to address the issue of a regulator's
responsibilities in a HACCP environment. That report, "The Role
of Regulatory Agencies and Industry in HACCP,"' 7 recommended
that FSIS serve as a third-party monitor or auditor.88 The agency
could review the program and the records, conduct some limited
verification tasks, but if the plant was following a valid program, the
agency would be "hands off."89
The role of FSIS in HACCP effectively shifted its function from
an active role to a more passive one. Not surprisingly, many of the
in-plant inspectors opposed the change, as did many others in the




86. 9 C.F.R. § 417.2 (2004).
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agency. Moreover, many consumer activists were not enthusiastic
with what was perceived as handing over the food safety to industry
while "tying the hands" of the in-plant inspector.
C. Proposed Mega-Reg
It took a tragedy, the E. coli 0157:H7 outbreak in the Pacific
Northwest United States, to energize the government into action. In
late 1992 through early 1993, dozens of people became ill and
several died (primarily small children) due to the contamination of
the ground beef used by a quick service restaurant. The incoming
Clinton Administration recognized the need for action and
responded to consumer concerns by focusing upon the one pro-
cedure which could address microbial contamination-HACCP. 9
In 1995, USDA issued a proposed regulation which would
mandate that all establishments develop and implement HACCP
plans.91 However, the following proposed regulations addressed
more than just mandatory HACCP:
" To address consumer activist concerns, it required establish-
ments producing fresh products to test those products for
Salmonella and measure their effectiveness against a national
standard.92 The regulation called for the establishment to take
additional actions if it failed the standard. The question of
whether FSIS would take regulatory action in the event of a
failure was not addressed.
* To continue with its "command and control" style, it proposed
mandating that all establishments have at least one anti-
microbial treatment at slaughter9" and specified cooling require-
ments for red meat.94
90. See Kerri E. Machado, Comment, Unfit for Human Consumption: Why American
Beef Is Making Us Sick, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 801 (2003).
91. Pathogen Reduction; Hazardous Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), 60
Fed. Reg. 6774 (Feb. 3, 1995).
92. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); proposed 9 C.F.R. § 381.79 (2004)
(poultry).
93. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); proposed 9 C.F.R. § 381.69 (2004)
(poultry).
94. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 318.25 (2001); proposed 9 C.F.R. § 381.66 (2001)
(poultry). Poultry already had such requirements.
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To ensure that establishments were accountable, FSIS asserted
the authority to suspend inspection at a facility which failed to
adopt a HACCP plan or if the agency determined the plan was
"invalid." The suspension would take effect immediately and
would remain until the establishment submitted an acceptable,
modified HACCP plan. If the invalidity involved an adulterated
product, the establishment would submit a testing plan to verify
the effectiveness of the modification.95
The proposal also would require all establishments to have a
sanitation standard operating procedure (SSOP). 96 Interestingly, the
proposal did not call for suspending inspection for SSOP non-
compliance. The inspector would merely apply a "U.S. Rejected"
tag to any equipment or room if there was an SSOP failure, and the
tag would remain until there was a reinspection by the inspector,
and the conditions were found acceptable.97 The name Mega-Reg
was coined as to describe the breadth of the regulation.
Given the magnitude of the changes, especially in terms of how
USDA would inspect meat and poultry establishments in the future,
FSIS held a variety of public meetings, both on the rule in general
and on particular aspects, such as testing. At one of the general
meetings, the entire "knowledgeable" FSIS bar challenged the
statutory authority of FSIS to suspend inspection for any reason
other than the finding of insanitary conditions at the facility.
Ironically, FSIS did not call for suspension for insanitary conditions
in the proposal rather the rejection of equipment or retention of
product.
D. Final Mega Reg
On July 25, 1996, FSIS published the final Mega-Reg.9" In
some regards, it was similar to the proposal in terms of mandating
HACCP and SSOPs. Yet, in regards to testing, it was substantially
changed. Moreover, the "command and control" components
dealing with anti-microbial treatments and cooling requirements for
red meat were dropped entirely.
95. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 326.7 (1996) (meat).
96. 9 C.F.R. § 416.12 (2001).
97. Proposed 9 C.F.R. § 308.3 (2000) (meat).
98. 9 C.F.R. pt. 416 (2001).
2005]
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
The four principal components of the final rule consisted of the
following:
* All establishments must develop and maintain written SSOPs,
designed to prevent direct product contamination.99 In the
preamble to the final regulation, USDA noted that SSOPs "are
important tools for meeting existing statutory sanitation
responsibilities . *..."100 FSIS did specify that SSOPs are a
condition for receiving inspection,"°' but at the time the final
rule was published, did not mention suspension of inspection
for SSOP non-compliance.
0 2
* All establishments must adopt and implement a HACCP plan.'0°
The regulations did specify what would constitute an "inade-
quate HACCP system, ' '  but suspension was not expressly
mentioned in the regulation, but was in the preamble.0 5
* Establishments that slaughter or produce raw products must test
to ascertain process control. 6 Although FSIS retained the
testing requirement, the organism changed from Salmonella to
generic E. coli.' °7 Moreover, in the preamble, FSIS clearly
linked repeated failure to comply with this performance
criterion as a basis for suspension.'
* FSIS will test for Salmonella, but now the testing will be
conducted by FSIS, and the results compared against a national
average.'0 9 The establishment's failure to meet the national
99. 9 C.F.R. pt. 416.11 (2001). In the final rule, FSIS combined the separate
HACCP and SSOP rules dealing with meat and poultry individually.
100. FSIS HACCP Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,834 (july 25, 1996).
101. 9 C.F.R. § 304.3 (2001) (Meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.22 (2001) (poultry).
102. In the preamble, FSIS noted that HACCP and SSOPs were different. HACCP
focuses upon the effectiveness of processes, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,818 (July 25, 1996),
whereas SSOPs focus upon meeting statutory sanitation responsibilities. 61 Fed.
Reg. 38,834.
103. According to FSIS, HACCP is not the same as SSOPs, "In a sense, the [SSOP
is] a prerequisite for HACCP." 61 Fed. Reg. 38,834.
104. 9 C.F.R. § 417.6 (2004).
105. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,823 (July 25, 1996).
106. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.94 (2004) (poultry).
107. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.94 (2004) (poultry).
108. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,844 (July 25, 1996).
109. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.94 (2004) (poultry).
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standard on three consecutive tests "will cause FSIS to suspend
inspection services."
'" 0
In a 1999 ruling, FSIS added the last component of the new
inspection system-the general sanitation performance standard."'
These regulations basically streamlined the agency's existing sanita-
tion regulations. Importantly, not all of the general sanitation
regulations address direct product contamination or adulteration.
For example, some general regulations addressed the required
lighting at the facility." 2 The agency indicated it would take sus-
pendsion action in the event there were violations of these
standards."'
Although four of the five major components of the agency's
inspection modernization mentioned suspension of inspection either
in the text of the regulation or in the preamble, the final rules as
adopted did not contain any procedural regulations on how FSIS
would impose suspension. According to the preamble, "FSIS has
decided not to finalize the proposed Rules of Practice at this
time."" 4
In one regard, the agency was fortunate that it did not finalize
the proposed Rules of Practice on July 25, 1999. Just three days
earlier, a federal court had found FSIS had violated the Admini-
strative Procedure Act (APA)"5 by failing to provide an establishment
with prior notice before suspending inspection." 6 This case, In re
Velasam Veal Connection' "7 was the first of three FSIS losses in the
agency's attempt to suspend inspection.
The Rules of Practice were not finalized until November 29,
1999.118 At that time, FSIS was in the middle of the second of the
three cases, Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. USDA."' Although two of
the three cases began prior to the Rules of Practice, it is helpful to
110. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(3)(iii).
111. 9 C.F.R. §§ 416.2-416.8; 61 Fed. Reg. 56,400 (Nov. 1, 1996).
112. 9 C.F.R. § 416.2(c).
113. 61 Fed. Reg. 56,399, 56,400-56,401.
114. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,823 (July 25, 1996).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (2001).
116. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
117. Id.
118. 9 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1999).
119. 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Tex. 2000) affd 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
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discuss FSIS enforcement and the Rules of Practice before analyzing
the trilogy of cases.
E. FSIS Rules of Practice for Enforcement of the
Mega-Reg and Other Regulations
In its Rules of Practice, FSIS specifies what type of regulatory
actions it will take, when each action is appropriate, and what
procedures govern each action. In essence, there are three basic
types of actions:
" "Regulatory Control Actions," where the in-plant inspector
unilaterally takes some immediate action based upon a non-
compliance with a regulatory requirement; 2 °
• "Suspension," where the agency removes its inspectors from a
part of the establishment or the entire establishment, in effect-
stopping operations. Suspension can be imposed with or
without prior notice depending on the allegations;' 2 ' and
* "Withdrawal," where the agency removes its inspectors
permanently or for some set period of time.'
1. Regulatory Control Actions
In the vast majority of cases, an enforcement action begins with
the in-plant inspector. 123  The in-plant inspector has significant
authority to deal with individual instances of non-compliance. In
regulatory parlance, the inspector can initiate "regulatory control
action."'124 He or she can retain (i.e., "tag") a product to prevent
shipment or further processing.1 25 Until the inspector removes the
tag, the product cannot move until it is brought into compliance.
26
The inspector can also reject equipment or the facility, prohibiting
its use until it is brought into compliance. In many situations,
120. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(a)(2004).
121. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(c) (2004); 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999).
122. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(b) (2004).
123. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999).
124. 9 C.F.R. § 500.1(a) (2004).
125. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, at 66,542-66,543.
126. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541.
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production is stopped until the equipment or facility is made
acceptable to the inspector.
127
In terms of procedures, the inspector will act when he or she
determines such action is necessary. Long-existing regulations
provide for an appeal of any such decision through the inspector's
chain of command: the immediate superior, the front-line super-
visor, the District Office, and Field Operations Staff at headquarters
to the FSIS Administrator.
12
In addition to these regulatory control actions, most enforce-
ment actions involve the issuance of a non-compliance record
(NR). 29 A NR is to be written whenever the inspector determines
that the establishment has failed to comply with a regulatory
requirement, including HACCP.'30 If HACCP is a system that relies
primarily on records, then the primary record for regulatory
enforcement is the NR.'3 ' Not only does the NR document an
individual instance of non-compliance, but these documents are also
used by the agency to support a suspension. The NR form is
designed to facilitate a quick review of non-compliances so that
repetitive failures can be easily determined and combined to show
that the system is inadequate in operation.12 On every NR form the
following statement is found, in bold: "This document serves as
written notification that your failure to comply with regulatory
requirements could result in additional regulatory or
administrative action." The "additional" action is suspension and
withdrawal.'
2. Suspension
A suspension is the temporary removal of inspectors from the
establishment.'34 It may be imposed with prior notice or, in certain
circumstances, imposed without prior notice.'35 In either case, the
127. Id.
128. 9 C.F.R § 306.5 (2004) (meat); 9 C.F.R. § 381.35 (2004) (poultry).
129. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999).
130. 64 Fed. Reg. at 66,543.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 9 C.F.R. § 500.3 (2004); 9 C.F.R. § 500.4 (2004).
134. 9 C.F.R § 500.1(c) (2004).
135. 9 C.F.R. § 500.3 (2004); 9 C.F.R. § 500.4 (2004).
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agency's district managers are delegated the authority to suspend
inspection, with appeal rights to FSIS headquarters.136
Based on the Velasam'37 case, the Rules of Practice incorporate
the requirements of APA3 8 that prior notice and an opportunity to
demonstrate or achieve compliance be provided unless there has
been willful non-compliance or the non-compliance endangered the
public health.139  Pursuant to the regulations, prior notice will be
given, unless: (a) the establishment has produced or shipped
adulterated or misbranded products; (b) the establishment does not
have a HACCP plan or a SSOP; (c) the sanitary conditions at the
establishment would render products adulterated; and (d) the
establishment violated the terms of a regulatory control action. 40
Even when prior notice is given, the agency has specified a
variety of situations where FSIS could suspend inspection if the
establishment has not "demonstrated or achieved compliance,"
suspension of inspection could occur when (a) the HACCP system is
inadequate due to multiple or recurring non-compliances;' 4 1 (b) the
SSOP has not been properly implemented or maintained based on
multiple or recurring non-compliances; (c) the establishment is not
maintaining sanitary conditions under the general sanitation
performance standard;'42 (d) the establishment is not conducting the
required generic E. coli testing; and (e) the establishment has failed
to meet the Salmonella performance standard. These situations
represent the agency's interpretation of its statutory authority to
suspend and have little, if any, support by the statute.
136. 9 C.F.R. § 500.5 (2004).
137. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) (2001).
139. Id.
140. 9 C.F.R. § 500.3. The regulation provides three other bases not relevant
here-establishment personnel have harassed or intimidated an FSIS employee, the
establishment has refused to destroy a condemned carcass or product, and in the
case of livestock, the establishment has violated the Humane Slaughter Act.
141. 9 C.F.R. § 417.6 (2004) (identifying those instances when the agency will
deem a HACCP plan to be inadequate-the plan does not meet the regulatory
requirements, the establishment is not implementing the plan, with emphasis upon
corrective actions and recordkeeping, and the adulterated product is produced or
shipped).
142. 9 C.F.R. §§ 416.2-416.8 (1999).
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3. Withdrawal
Withdrawal is a more permanent suspension. 4 3 It involves the
removal of inspectors for a definite time or indefinitely. 44 The 1967
and 1968 amendments to the Inspection Acts1 45 authorized FSIS to
withdraw inspection from any establishment if the establishment or a
responsibly connected individual was convicted of more than one
misdemeanor involving transactions in food or any felony. 46 FSIS
has exercised this authority quite frequently and consequently, the
procedural rules have been well established.
FSIS follows the statutory requirement that an opportunity for a
hearing be provided prior to withdrawal. 47 Under the general
USDA Rules of Practice, 148 the agency would file a complaint with an
administrative law judge (ALJ) who would hold a formal hearing. If
the ALJ found for the agency, there would be an appeal directly to
the USDAJudicial Officer with federal court review. 49
Virtually all of the withdrawal cases prior to the Mega-Reg
involved the agency's statutory authority to withdraw inspection if
the establishment or a connected individual was convicted of any
felony or more than one misdemeanor involving transactions in
food. In these cases, the agency continued to provide inspection
throughout the proceedings. The other cases involved situations
where employees of the establishment had harassed or assaulted
inspection personnel. Obviously, with these cases, inspection was
suspended pending the litigation in order to protect FSIS
employees. In all of the litigated withdrawal cases, the company was
successful in only one instance, and such case was based upon
procedure, not substantive grounds.
1 50
In the new Rules of Practice, FSIS has greatly expanded the
situations where it will seek withdrawal of inspection. In essence, the
agency has asserted the right to seek withdrawal in the same
143. 9 C.F.R § 500.6 (2004).
144. Id.
145. 21 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
146. 21 U.S.C § 467 (2001); 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2001) (meat).
147. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c)(1), (2) (2001).
148. 7 C.F.R. pt. I, subpart H.
149. FMIA authorizes the district court to review. 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2001); PPIA
authorizes the court of appeals. 21 U.S.C. § 467 (2001).
150. Cherin v. Lyng, 874 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding FSIS failed to obtain
the individual's concurrence in a settlement agreement).
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situations where it has asserted the authority to suspend inspection.
The agency has authority to withdraw in the following situations:
" Non-compliance with the Mega-Reg (HACCP, SSOPs, generic
E. coli testing, the Salmonella performance standard, and the
general sanitation performance standard); and
* Shipment of adulterated product.'
F. Enforcement Actions Under the Mega-Reg Generally
Since the Mega-Reg became effective, there have been literally
hundreds of enforcement actions taken by FSIS. l' The most
common is a Notice of Intended Enforcement (NOIE).55 The
NOIE, consistent with the court's ruling in Velasam, provides an
establishment with notice and an opportunity to demonstrate or
achieve compliance with Mega-Reg requirements.'54  In most
occasions, the establishment will take action to allay any concerns the
agency might have and continue operations. In some cases, due to
an inadequate response or repeated positive laboratory findings, an
actual suspension may result, requiring additional actions on the
part of the establishment to respond to agency concerns.'55
If the thesis of this article is correct-that FSIS lacks the statutory
authority to suspend inspection for most violations of the Mega-
Reg-there have been hundreds of enforcement actions threatening
and/or imposing suspension; the question becomes why has there
been virtually no lawsuits? The answer may rest in several practical
issues which make litigation a less attractive course of action. First,
the NOIE has minimized the number of times actual suspension will
be imposed-an establishment may demonstrate or achieve com-
pliance by responding to issues raises in the NOIE without losing
151. 9 C.F.R. § 500.6 (2004). The regulation also includes harassment and assault,
refusal to destroy condemned product, non-compliance with the Humane Slaughter
Act, and refusal to conduct generic E. coli testing.
152. FSIS publishes a quarterly report of all enforcement actions taken. See FSIS,
available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/quarterlyenforcement-
reports/index.asp.
153. Allison Beers, Industry Praises New Field Instructions, FOOD CHEM. NEws, Feb. 5,
2001 at 24.
154. See FSIS, USDA Food Safety & Inspection Services Quarterly Regulatory and
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production time or going to litigation.. Second, many of the
companies who have been involved in enforcement actions have a
brand name which they wish to protect-a challenge to FSIS when
the agency is alleging non-compliance with food safety regulations
could damage a company's brand name. Third, the establishment
may recognize it is placing itself at a competitive disadvantage by
resorting to litigation. Fourth, even if a company is successful in
litigation, it must not be forgotten that FSIS will continue inspecting
the establishment when the case is over. The agency retains
sufficient authority to increase the intensity of inspection and
increase product testing for adulterants which will make operating
under inspection more difficult. There have been three occasions
when these practical considerations were not sufficient to dissuade
the establishment from suing FSIS. In each of these cases, the
establishment won.
V. THE TRILOGY OF LITIGATED SUSPENSION CASES
The number of cases filed in response to suspension actions is
very limited. Indeed, the cases brought by establishments since the
federal inspection system was created are few and far between. The
practical factors must be weighed whenever litigation is considered
and generally mitigate against the litigation option.
In the trilogy of cases, the need to challenge the suspension
overcame the practical restrictions. In all of these cases, inspection
had already been withdrawn (or would have been withdrawn the next
day). Additionally, none of these firms had a recognizable brand
name. Furthermore, the establishments believed either there was no
violation or compliance was impossible. Finally, they recognized
their business would be destroyed by a suspension so that future
agency actions following the lawsuit would be moot if no lawsuit was
initiated.
A. Velasam and Procedural Due Process
Strictly speaking, In re Velasam Veal Connection'56 was not a Mega-
Reg case. The final Mega-Reg was not published until three days
after the decision. However, it was perceived by many that the
156. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
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agency was testing its suspension authority in a case the agency
thought itwould win.
5 7
In early 1996, Velasam had entered a consent agreement with
FSIS concerning the alleged harassment of FSIS officials.' The
alleged harassment was linked to a 1995 recall of Velasam products
based upon laboratory tests showing the presence of sulfites in the
products. Sulfites cannot be added to meat directly since the
substance masks spoilage, but can be added if the sulfites are a
component of an ingredient. If added, the presence of sulfites need
not be declared on the label if present at a level of ten parts per
million (ppm) or less in the finished product.'59
In May 1996, the agency conducted a laboratory test of one of
Velasam's seasoning blends. The agency discovered the seasoning
contained extremely low levels of sulfites fourteen parts per million
(ppm). Without providing any notice or even the basis for its action,
FSIS filed a complaint with the ALJ and summarily suspended
inspection at Velasam on June 13, 1996.160
Velasam asserted that neither FMIA nor the previous consent
agreement authorized the summary suspension and moved that the
lawsuit be dismissed.' 6 ' Under USDA Rules of Practice, an ALJ can
grant any motion, except a motion to dismiss.'62 Accordingly, the
ALJ did not grant the motion. This decision was appealed to the
judicial officer who ruled that no motion to dismiss would be granted
until the hearing was conducted. Alleging final agency action and
irreparable harm, Velasam filed suit in the District Court for the
Northern District of California asserting both that FSIS was required
to provide notice and an opportunity to demonstrate or achieve
compliance as required by APA and that FSIS lacked the statutory
authority to suspend inspection. 6 '
In its decision, the court chose to rule on the procedural issue
thereby avoiding a ruling on the statutory authority. The court
found that Section 558(c) of APA requires notice and opportunity
157. Litigation Notes from Dennis Johnson regarding Velasam (on file with author)
[hereinafter Litigation Notes].
158. 55 Agric. Dec. 300, 1996 WL 367077 (U.S.D.A.); 1996 WL 367076 (U.S.D.A.).
159. FSIS Labeling Policy Memorandum 094B, Dec. 17, 1986, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/larc/Policies/PolicyMemos.pdf.
160. 55 Agric. Dec. 300, 1996 WL 367077 (U.S.D.A.); 1996 WL 367076 (U.S.D.A.).
161. Id.
162. 7 C.F.R. § 1.144 (2001).
163. See Litigation Notes, supra note 157.
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prior to any suspension of a license absent public health concern or a
willful violation.164  Since this opportunity was not granted to
Velasam, the court ordered FSIS to restore inspection during the
pendency of the administrative proceeding. Interestingly, in
discussing whether there was a willful violation, the district court
noted: "Even presuming there is substantial evidence that Velasam
added sulfites . . .the Court finds that at least a serious question is
raised as to whether or not the [FSIS sulfite] policy is clear
enough ....165 In light of the decision and the court's questioning
as to whether any violation occurred, FSIS and Velasam settled the
matter without hearing.
66
As noted above, the Velasam caused consternation within FSIS.
The agency officials were hoping to obtain a court decision
supporting their interpretation that the agency can impose a
suspension without any prior notice. The agency had included such
a provision in this Mega-Reg proposal. Although the Rules of
Practice were removed before the final rule published,'67 the Velasam
decision was immediately incorporated into agency practice and
ultimately incorporated in the rules regarding prior notice. Not
only was notice required, but also there could be no suspension if the
establishment could demonstrate or achieve compliance. Hence, the
NOIE was born, which benefits both industry and FSIS. It provides
establishments with due process, and by so doing, it helped
minimize the number of actual suspensions which could have
resulted in more frequent litigation challenging the suspension
authority.
B. Supreme Beef and the Requirement of Adulteration
FSIS promised to issue its Rules of Practice following the
promulgation of the final Mega-Reg, but FSIS did not do so for
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. As of this writing, Velasam is still in business, but lost most of its customers
forever. Velasam did file a Bivens action against several FSIS officials in there
personal capacity and won a judgment which is currently on appeal. Id.
167. Since the final rule was sent to the Federal Register on July 18, 1996, it could
not have been modified based on the Velasam opinion, but it would be fair to say the
Rules of Practice may not have been modified to provide notice had Velasam been
decided differently. The text of the prior notice section of the regulations (9 C.F.R.
§ 500.4) dealing with "opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance" are taken
verbatim from Section 558(c) of APA.
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several years. Meanwhile, FSIS initiated enforcement actions, but
did so consistently with Velasam-the agency provides notice and an
opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance. However, it was
simply a matter of time before a lawsuit was filed challenging the
agency's authority to suspend for non-compliance with the Mega-
Reg. When the first suit was filed, it did not challenge FSIS's
asserted authority to suspend for HACCP or SSOP non-compliance,
but rather the suspension for failure to meet the Salmonella
performance standard.
The Salmonella performance standards were based on a national
average incident rate. However, for ground beef, the national rate
was an average of two distinct geographic rates. The northern
plants"' accounted for seventy percent of the samples but only thirty
percent of the total positives. Conversely, the southern plants had
seventy percent of the positives, while only comprising thirty percent
of the samples.'69
Under the Mega-Reg, if an establishment failed the perfor-
mance standard on three consecutive tests, it was subject to suspend-
sion. 7 ° Given the ground beef standard's bias against southern
establishments, it was not surprising that the first triple failure
occurred in the south-specifically Texas.'7
In October 1999, when Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., a beef
grinder in Texas, failed its third set, FSIS issued an NOIE requiring
the company to take action to ensure compliance with the
standard. 72 As a result, Supreme took a variety of actions, and FSIS
started a fourth set of samples. When it became clear that Supreme
would fail the fourth set, FSIS notified Supreme that the agency was
suspending inspection the next day. In response, Supreme filed for
and received a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring FSIS to
continue inspection at the facility.' The primary argument used by
Supreme was that FSIS lacked the statutory authority to suspend
168. See FSIS, Nationwide Federal Plant Raw Ground Beef Microbiological Survey, Aug.
1993-Mar. 1994, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPHS/baseline/rwgrbeef.pdf.
169. Id.
170. 9 C.F.R. § 310.25(b)(3) (2004). A third consecutive failure "constitutes failure
to maintain sanitary conditions and failure to maintain an adequate HACCP plan."
171. Indeed, the second three set failure also occurred in Texas, but no litigation
arose since the company passed FSIS verification (fourth) series. Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc. v. USDA, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1051.
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inspection based on the results of the Salmonella performance
standard testing.
Although the performance standard regulation indicates that
three consecutive failures constitutes non-compliance with sanitation
and HACCP requirements,1 74 FSIS only defended its action on the
basis of the statutory provision dealing with insanitary conditions,
Section 8 of FMIA. There was no challenge or defense made on the
basis of the HACCP regulations. Hence, the agency's action could
be justified, if at all, on whether there were insanitary conditions at
the facility. 175 In this regard, the proceedings before the district
court did not go well for the agency. At the hearing following the
TRO, the Administrator of FSIS conceded during cross-examination
that the agency sought suspension simply because of the Salmonella
failures. Indeed, the Administrator basically admitted that there
were no insanitary conditions at Supreme.
176
The district court continued the TRO to allow both sides to brief
the matter. During that time, FSIS initiated an intensified testing
program at Supreme-not a testing program for Salmonella, but for
the adulterant E. coli 0157:H7. During the testing a product tested
positive for the adulterant, and a recall took place. 77  Notwith-
standing this positive test result, the court granted a preliminary
174. Id.
175. The agency did try to assert that Supreme had not exhausted its
administrative remedies. After the suit was filed, FSIS finally issued its Rules of
Practice. 64 Fed. Reg. 66,541, 66,543 (Nov. 29, 1999). The agency tried to argue
that under the rules, Supreme had to complete an administrative hearing before an
ALJ. This defense was rejected by the District Court.
176. Q. Is it correct to say Mr. Billy that the Notice of Suspension that Supreme
received about failure to maintain sanitary conditions is based solely on the alleged
failure of ground beef to meet the Salmonella performance standards?
A. It's based on the successive failure of three Salmonella sample sets.
Q. It is not based on inspectors making a judgment and determination that the
plant was in an insanitary condition?
A. There have not been significant problems with the sanitation practices in the
plant.
Q. Is that ayes?
A. Yes, it would be a yes. Yes.
R. 1237-1238 on appeal to the Fifth Circuit No. 00-11008, Supreme Beef Processors,
Inc. v. USDA, 275 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2001).
177. Recall Notification Report 062-99, Food Safety and Inspection Services, Dec.
26, 1999, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/rnrfiles/rnr062-99.htm.
Interestingly, the company was apprised of the positive on Christmas day.
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injunction, holding that FSIS lacked the statutory authority to
suspend inspection on the basis of the Salmonella failure.
7 8
FSIS appealed, relying heavily on the Nova Scotia 179 case.
According to FSIS, the term "sanitation" can cover all food safety
controls at the establishment, and the Salmonella standard serves as a
proxy to assess the effectiveness of those controls.' The Fifth
Circuit rejected FSIS's argument. Without rejecting Nova Scotia, the
court found that the Salmonella performance standard did not fit
within the statutory provisions dealing with sanitation.' 8 ' First, the
salmonella performance standard "regulates the procurement of raw
materials," not conditions at the establishment, which is required by
the term "rendered" in the sanitary conditions provision.8 2 Cross-
contamination would not be sufficient.18  Second, the mere presence
of Salmonella does not render the product adulterated since
Salmonella itself is neither an adulterant in raw ground beef, nor is it
an indicator of adulterating pathogens." 4  Hence, the court
concluded that the sanitary conditions provisions could not justify
suspension.
181
The court was careful to distinguish Nova Scotia. The Fifth
Circuit referred to comments made by the Second Circuit indicating
178. 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
179. 568 F.2d 240.
180. For virtually the entire time the case was pending, FSIS was conducting daily
testing of Supreme's product for E. coli 0157:H7. Agency testing of fresh product
puts a strain on a business for if the business ships, and there is a positive, the
product must be recalled, which is not conducive to good customer relations. If the
company holds the product for the five to seven days it takes to receive confirmed
results from the agency, much of the fresh product's shelf life is gone. In addition,
in the case of Supreme, it lost several government contracts due to the FSIS
allegations. This all combined to force Supreme into bankruptcy. Ironically, once
Supreme was in bankruptcy, FSIS moved to dismiss the appeal since it was moot in
that the company may be out of business and hence not need inspection. The Fifth
Circuit found that the case was not moot. Supreme Beef Processors, 275 F.3d 432, 438.
Moreover, it allowed the National Meat Association to intervene so that even if
Supreme did not resume its business, the case could be heard on appeal. Id.
181. Id. at 443.
182. Id. at 441.
183. Id. at 442.
184. Supreme Beef Processor, 275 F.2d at 442-43. Indeed, the court commented that
FSIS may not actually want such a result, for if Salmonella is an indicator of an
adulterant, it would mean that a raw product with Salmonella would be adulterated,
eliminating many raw products currently being sold. Id.
185. Id.
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a plausible argument could be made that the statute could apply
only to conditions, not processes.8 6 Moreover, unlike Nova Scotia,
where the government looked to operations in the plant, the
government in Supreme was focusing upon conditions outside the
facility (i.e., incoming raw materials), which was unprecedented.
8 7
In short, FSIS lost the case as a result of its inability to
demonstrate the statutory requirements of the insanitary conditions
provisions-the conditions must relate to the plant and there must
be product adulteration. The issue of whether sanitation could
encompass processing was not decided.
C. Nebraska Beef
The last of the "suspension cases," Nebraska Beef,' is very
unsatisfying for the legal scholar because it did not truly advance the
issue. Nebraska Beef had received an NOIE in 2002 due in part to
concerns with condensation and sanitary dressing practices at
slaughter. Moreover, Nebraska Beef was implicated in a positive E.
coli 0157:H7 test in ground product' 9
In January 2003, while the President of Nebraska Beef,
company counsel, and the company's trade association representa-
tive were meeting with the USDA Undersecretary for Food Safety,
the District Office suspended inspection at the facility. The
establishment promptly filed a request for a TRO to reinstate
inspectors. 9 °
In the complaint, Nebraska Beef alleged that its products were
safe, that FSIS lacked the statutory authority to suspend, and that
suspension imposed irreparable injury on the company. 9' The
district court issued the TRO with most of its discussion centering on
the economic harm caused by suspension. Instead of fighting the
issue, FSIS simply entered a consent agreement with Nebraska Beef,
stating that the company will comply with all FSIS regulations.1
2
186. Id. at 441.
187. Id. at 442 n.38.
188. Nebraska Beef. Ltd. v. USDA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25104 (D. Neb, 2003);
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Although FSIS touted that the case supported its authority,
neither the opinion nor the settlement agreement supported such a
claim. It could be the case that FSIS was simply caught unaware.
Following Nebraska Beef, the agency embarked on an internal
program designed to ensure it had adequate documentation
throughout any enforcement proceeding.
VI. FSIS LACKS THE AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND FOR
MEGA-REG VIOLATIONS
Based upon the trilogy of cases, it is clear that FSIS simply lacks
the authority to suspend inspection for HACCP non-compliance, as
well as non-compliance with the Salmonella and general sanitation
performance standards. Even with SSOP non-compliance, the
agency must meet its burden of proof.
A. The Language of Statute Does Not Authorize Suspension
Once again, the starting point is the language of the statute.'93
The section which speaks of suspension provides, in relevant part,
"where the sanitary conditions of any such establishment are such
that the meat or meat food products are rendered adulterated,
[FSIS] shall refuse to allow said meat or meat food products to be
labeled, marked, stamped, or tagged as 'inspected and passed."'194
Under the plain language of this provision, FSIS must have a basis to
conclude the products are "rendered adulterated" as a precondition
to imposing suspension.195
In regards to the meaning of "rendered," all courts have held
that the conditions must be intrinsic to the establishment.' 96 Mere
cross-contamination is not sufficient.'97 As for the meaning of
"adulterated," the agency must demonstrate that the product would
193. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
194. Section 8 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 608 (2004).
195. The actual language of FMIA does not technically provide for suspension of
inspection or the removal of federal inspectors. It only authorizes the refusal to
mark products "inspected and passed." The inspector must remain in the facility.
It is PPIA which speaks of "refusing inspection." 21 U.S.C. § 456(b) (2004).
However, this is more of a technical difference since the mere presence of an
inspector at the facility does not change the effect of a suspension.
196. Supreme Beef Processors, 275 F.3d 442 n.38.
197. Id. at 442.
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be adulterated as that term is specified by FMIA or PPIA. 9 s Hence,
findings of pathogenic organisms on raw products which do not
adulterate the product would be insufficient to justify the use of
Section 8's suspension authority. More specifically, the presence of
Salmonella on any raw product would not constitute adulteration and
could not be used to justify suspension.
In the cases under Section 8, FSIS would need to establish
adulteration under Section 1(m)(4) of FMIA.199  This section
provides that a product is adulterated "[i]f it has been prepared,
packed, or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have
become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been
rendered injurious to health." Under this section, actual contamina-
tion of product need not be shown. 200  However, the government
must show that the food was processed under conditions whereby
there is a reasonable possibility that the product was contaminated
from the insanitary conditions.20 '
Accordingly, to meet its burden of proof, FSIS must establish
that insanitary conditions existed at the establishment and there is a
reasonable possibility that the food will become contaminated with
filth or rendered injurious as the result of those insanitary condi-
tions. 202 Addressing the latter factor first, in the absence of a nexus
between the conditions and the product, no adulteration could
occur. Non-compliance with the FSIS general sanitation perfor-
mance standard alone, which unlike the SSOPs does not deal with
198. Id. at 438-39.
199. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2004).
200. United States v. H. B. Gregory, 502 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States v. General Foods Corp., 446 F. Supp. 740, 752 (N.D.N.Y.), affd 591 F.2d
1332 (2d Cir. 1978). Many of the cases cited in this article interpret the identical
language from FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4). In adopting this language for the
FMIA, Congress intended that "essentially the same criteria be applied in
determining wholesomeness .... S. REP. No. 90-799, reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2188, 2203.
201. United States v. International Exterminator Corp., 294 F.2d 270, 271 (5th
Cir. 1961); Berger v. United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1952); General Foods
Corp., 446 F. Supp. at 752.
202. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2004); Gregory, 502 F.2d at 704.
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direct contamination, would not be grounds for suspension. 3
Hence, the critical issue is the meaning of "insanitary conditions."' 04
B. The Case Law Does Not Support Suspension Absent Visible Evidence of
Insanitary Conditions at the Facility
Based upon the thorough review of the case law regarding
insanitary conditions, in order for the government to be successful, it
must introduce evidence of visible, insanitary conditions of the
facility. There is one exception-Nova Scotia. In that case, the court
expanded the definition of insanitary conditions to include pro-
cessing as opposed to the physical condition of the facility.0" How-
ever, the Nova Scotia case is so readily distinguishable that it does not
support FSIS's asserted suspension authority.
As an initial matter, the court in Nova Scotia recognized it was
expanding the definitions of insanitary conditions beyond the
normal meaning.206 However, the court was willing to read the
statutory provision expansively for a number of reasons: (a) a public
health statute should be read broadly, (b) Congress gave no
indication to read the provision narrowly, (c) the "knowledgeable"
bar had never challenged FDA's authority, (d) FSIS had established
similar standards, and (e) invalidating this rule would invalidate
other rules. 207  On each of these points above, FSIS's asserted
authority to suspend for reasons other than insanitary plant condi-
tions fails to meet the reasons used by the court in Nova Scotia to
justify its expansive reading.
First, FMIA and PPIA are public health statutes and should be
read broadly.20° However, the issue before the court in Nova Scotia
was not whether an agency can suspend inspection. In Nova Scotia,
the issue was whether FDA could regulate the processing in the first
203. 9 C.F.R. § 500.4 (2004). United States v. International Exterminator Corp.,
294 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir. 1961); Berger v. United States, 200 F.2d 818, 821 (2d
Cir. 1952); General Foods Corp., 446 F. Supp. at 752.
204. 21 U.S.C. § 601(m)(4) (2004).
205. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 245.
206. Id. The court admitted that "on a first reading the language of the subsection
appears to cover only 'insanitary conditions,' 'whereby it [the food] may have been
rendered injurious to health' . . . And a plausible argument can be made that the
references are to insanitary conditions in the plant itself . Id.
207. Id. at 246-48.
208. Id. at 246.
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instance to protect the public health.20 ' Here, the issue is not
whether FSIS can adopt HACCP regulations since such authority is
clearly granted in the inspection acts. 10 The issue was whether FSIS
can suspend inspection for the failure to follow such regulations.
Suspension simply is not necessary to achieve the public health goal.
Indeed, FSIS has sufficient statutory authority to protect the public
health by seeking an injunction "to prevent and restrain violations"
of a public health requirement-the same injunctive authority
sought by FDA in Nova Scotia.21
The second basis of the Nova Scotia decision is congressional
intent. On the issue of suspension, Congress clearly did not intend
to provide the agency with unfettered discretion when it came to
suspension of inspection. Not only did Congress prescribe precisely
when such authority could be exercised, but also it specified how it
should be exercised. For example, in the case of withdrawal based
upon convictions, the statute provides the due process require-
ments. 2  More importantly, in the 1986 Amendments (which
expired in 1992), Congress called the power to suspend an "extra-
ordinary authority" and should be exercised only in a federal district
court proceeding with full due process protections for the
establishment. 21 Third, in the public meetings on the Mega-Reg,
every lawyer present testified that, with the exception of insanitary
conditions at the plant resulting in adulterated product, FSIS lacked
the authority to suspend for HACCP and Salmonella performance
standard failures.1 4
In response to the last two justifications, FMIA does give FSIS
the authority to promulgate processing standards, and the
"knowledgeable bar" is in agreement with this authority. The only
regulations which would be invalid here are those Sections of the
Rules of Practice in 9 C.F.R. Part 500, which are not within FSIS's
statutory authority. In sum, the reasons which led the court in Nova
209. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 242-43, 245.
210. Section 21 of FMIA provides the "all inspections and examinations ... shall
be made in such a manner as described in the rules and regulations prescribed by
"FSIS." 21 U.S.C. § 621 (1999); see also Section 14(b) of PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 463
(1999).
211. Section 21 of PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 467(c); Section 404 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 674.
212. Section 18 of PPIA, 21 U.S.C. § 467; Section 401 of FMIA, 21 U.S.C. § 671
(2004).
213. H.R. REP. 99-624 at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 6066, 6083.
214. H.R. REP. 99-624 at 37 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N 6066, 6083.
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Scotia to abandon the plain language of the statute do not apply in
the case of FSIS' authority to suspend inspection in cases other than
"traditional" insanitary conditions.
C. FSIS's Previous Actions Have Demonstrated the Need For Judicial
Involvement in Suspension Matters
Beyond these legal arguments, there is a policy argument to
support the conclusion that FSIS lacks the authority asserted-the
need to ensure suspension is imposed only when it is justified. It
should be noted that under the Rules of Practice FSIS can suspend
inspection without any external review outside the agency. It can
even withdraw inspection based on the review of an ALJ.
Without the requirement of a disinterested third party review,
which would occur if FSIS requested an injunction from a federal
district court, there can be errors. Indeed, there have been errors.
The one thread linking the three "suspension cases" is that the
agency could not justify its actions to the court.
In Velasam, 1 5 the court noted that FSIS had no evidence that
there had been a violation.2" 6 Yet, Velasam was closed for over a
month. In Supreme, FSIS testified that there were no problems with
sanitation at Supreme. Yet, Supreme would ultimately file for
bankruptcy.217 In Nebraska Beef,218 though it will never be known, the
speed with which FSIS settled and the initiation of a new internal
procedure at the agency to handle enforcement cases creates an
inference that the agency was ill-prepared to defend its actions
calling into serious question whether the suspension should have
been imposed in the first instance.
As an endnote to Velasam and Nebraska Beef, following the sus-
pension, both companies filed a federal claims action against various
FSIS personnel in their individual capacities. Velasam received an
award in its case, and Nebraska Beef's case is still pending.219
215. 55 Agric. Dec. 300; 1996 WL 367077; 1996 WL 367076.
216. Id.
217. Although Supreme won its case, it lost the war-FSIS began testing all
product for E. coli 0157:H7 on a daily basis, an unprecedented action which raises
the appearance of vindictiveness. Ultimately, the delay in shipping posed by this
intensified testing resulted in Supreme's bankruptcy.
218. Nebraska Beef. Ltd. v. USDA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25104 (D. Neb. 2003);
Nebraska Beef, Ltd. v. USDA, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4993 (D. Neb. 2003).
219. Id.
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FSIS has chosen never to institute an injunction against an
inspected establishment for the failure to follow the regulations.
Indeed, when FSIS had the authority to suspend under the 1986
Amendments, but only through a district court proceeding, it never
exercised the authority. It would seem that FSIS would rather act
unilaterally as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner than make a
case before a federal judge. Based upon the agency's track record, it
is easy to understand why.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is a truism of administrative law that an agency cannot take
action except as authorized by statute.22 ° In the case of the
inspection acts, Congress has provided FSIS with the authority to
suspend only in discrete circumstances, none of which authorize
suspension for an inadequate HACCP program or the failure to
comply with a Salmonella performance standard or the general
sanitation performance standards. To assert that FSIS has such
authority is not only contrary to the plain language of the statute,
Congressional intent, and case law, but is also simply ill-advised.
220. See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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